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Abstract
Starting from the reward-risk model for portfolio selection introduced in De Giorgi
(2004), we derive the reward-risk Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) analogously
to the classical mean-variance CAPM. The reward-risk portfolio selection arises from
an axiomatic definition of reward and risk measures based on few basic principles,
including consistency with second order stochastic dominance. With complete markets,
we show that at any financial market equilibrium, investors’ optimal allocations are
comonotonic and therefore the capital market equilibrium model can be reduced to
a representative investor model. Moreover, the pricing kernel is an explicitly given,
monotone function of the market portfolio return, corresponding to the increments
of the distortion function characterizing the representative investor’s risk perceptions.
Finally, an empirical application shows that the reward-risk CAPM better captures
the cross-section of US stock returns than the mean-variance CAPM does.
Keywords: stochastic dominance, mean-risk models, portfolio optimization, CAPM.
JEL Classification: G11, D81.
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1 Introduction
The Portfolio Theory of Markowitz (1952) evaluates investments in term of their means and
variances. In this context, if investors agree on the assets’ return distributions and the risk
free asset exists, the mean-variance Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964),
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) arises as the equilibrium model. From a theoretical point
of view, variance is a debatable measure of risk. First, it is a symmetric measure on the
space of random variables and treats positive and negative deviations from the mean in the
same way, while investors typically assign a higher weight to negative deviations than to
positive ones (due to decreasing risk aversion). Second, there exists a plenty of empirical
evidence to suggest that the return distribution of many assets exhibits fat tails and hence
variance fails to fully describe the risk of extreme losses. Also, the empirical problems of the
mean-variance CAPM in capturing the cross-sectional pattern of stock returns may reflect
the problems of variance in capturing risk.
Several alternative risk measures have been proposed in order to better capture investors’
risk perception, including semivariance (Markowitz 1959, Ogryczak and Ruszczynski 1997),
general lower partial moments (Jean 1975, Bawa 1975, Unser 2000), value-at-risk (Jorion
1997), expected shortfall (Acerbi and Tasche 2002, Rockafellar and Uryasev 2002). Equi-
librium capital-market models based on these risk measures have also been developed, for
instance the mean-semivariance CAPM by Hogan and Warren (1974) and Bawa and Linden-
berg (1977). Interestingly, this particular model seems to better capture the cross-section
of stock returns than the mean-variance model (see for instance Harlow and Rao 1989, Post
and Van Vliet 2004).
Unfortunately, economic theory gives only minimal guidance in selecting a specific risk
measure. One alternative approach is to use the general rules of stochastic dominance (see
for example Post 2003, Kuosmanen 2004). These rules however generally do not imply a
specific risk measure. Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1997, 1999), being concerned
with banking regulation, proposed an axiomatic definition of risk measures based on four
properties (positive sub-additivity, monotonicity, translation invariance and homogeneity)
and introduced the concept of coherent measure of risk, that strongly influenced the way of
thinking at risk measurement and risk management.
De Giorgi (2004) extends this approach to a general risk-reward framework for portfo-
lio selection, based on consistency with second order stochastic dominance, in addition to
other basic properties. From Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) we known that an investment
opportunity dominates another by second order stochastic dominance, if and only if it is
preferred by all risk averse expected utility maximizer. Hence, the consistency with the
second order stochastic dominance is the minimal requirement on the reward-risk model in
order to preserve the preference relations shared by all risk averse, expected utility maxi-
mizers. De Giorgi (2004) also gives a unique characterization of reward measures (the mean)
and suggests a class of risk measures for portfolio selection, that are related to the Choquet
Expected Utility Theory.1 In this setup, a risk measure arises from a convex distortion of
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the physical survival distribution function and the portfolio decision problem can be solved
by means of linear quintile regression (Bassett, Koenker, and Kordas 2004).
In this study we derive the “reward-risk CAPM”, that is, the financial market equilibrium
model associated with the general risk-reward framework. The model basically is a general
model of a complete market with risk averse investors. Interestingly, the model implies that
every investor’s optimal allocation is comonotonic to the market portfolio, analogously to
the Tobin separation theorem in the classical mean-variance approach. Comonoticity implies
that the preferences of the different investors must be very similar in order to achieve market
equilibrium. This in turn reduces the model to a representative investor model ; aggregate
demand and market equilibrium can be described as the outcome of the optimization problem
of an individual investor.2 Equilibrium is characterized by a pricing kernel that is a decreasing
function of market portfolio return. The exact shape of the kernel is determined by the
distortion function that describes the risk attitude of the representative investor and the
relationship is explicitly given.
An empirical study compares the empirical performance of the reward-risk CAPM with
that of the mean-variance CAPM for US stock market data. The results suggest that the
reward-risk CAPM better captures the cross-section of stock returns than the mean-variance
CAPM does. Interestingly, the results support the mean-semivariance CAPM, suggesting
that semivariance is a better measure for investment risk than variance. This result is
quite surprising, because our general reward-risk model rests on substantially more general
assumptions than the mean-semivariance model does.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present the reward-
risk portfolio selection problem and we derive the reward-risk Capital Asset Pricing Model.
In Section 3, we test empirically the market efficiency based on the reward-risk CAPM.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a two-periods exchange economy. The model setup follows Duffie (1988). Let
Ω = {1, . . . , S} denote the state of nature at the final period T .3 F = 2Ω is the power
algebra on Ω, i.e. the set of all possible events arising from Ω. Uncertainty is modeled by the
probability space (Ω,F ,P), where the probability measure P on Ω satisfies ps = P
[{s}] > 0
for all s = 1, . . . , S, i.e. every state of the world has strictly positive probability to occur.
The space G of real-valued measurable functions is endowed with the scalar product X ·Y =∑S
s=1 X(s)Y (s) ps = E
[
X Y
]
.
There are K+1 assets with payoffs Ak. The asset 0 is the risk-free asset with payoff A0 =
1. The supply of risky assets is exogenously given and denoted by θk > 0 (k = 1, . . . , K),
while the risk-free asset is in elastic supply with exogenously given price 11+r , where r > 0 is
the risk-free rate of return. The marketed subspace X is the span of (Ak)k=0,1,...,K . Without
loss of generality, we assume that no asset is redundant, i.e. dim(X ) = K+1, where obviously
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K + 1 ≤ S and K + 1 = S if markets are complete. The market portfolio is the sum of all
available risky assets, i.e. ω˜ =
∑K
k=1 Ak θk.
There are i = 1, . . . , I investors, initially endowed with wealth wi > 0. The numbers θik
denote the amount of security k held by investor i, qk denotes the k-th security price. Thus,
when trading these securities, the investor can attain the payoff X =
∑K
k=0 Ak θ
i
k ∈ X where
θi satisfies the budget restriction (i.e. q(X) =
∑K
k=0 qk θ
i
k ≤ wi). We denote by Bi the subset
of X , such that X ∈ Bi is budget-feasible for investor i, i.e. Bi = {X ∈ X |q(X) ≤ wi}.
Note that Bi is a convex set.
Investors evaluate portfolio payoffs according to a risk-reward pair (µ, ρi), where µ(X) =
E
[
X
]
and ρi : G → R is a risk measure as defined in De Giorgi (2004, Definition 3.2). The
measure ρi satisfies the following four properties:
• Convexity: ρi(αX + (1− α)Y ) ≤ α ρi(X) + (1− α) ρi(Y ) for all α ∈ [0, 1], X, Y ∈ G;
• Zero payoff condition: ρi(0) = 0;
• Translation invariance: ρi(X + α) = ρi(X) for all X ∈ G, α ∈ R;
• Isotonicity w.r.t. second order stochastic dominance: X &SSD Y ⇒ ρi(X) ≤ ρi(Y ).
The convexity ensures the diversification effect. In fact, when convexity is not satisfied for
some X,Y ∈ G and α ∈ (0, 1), then one could split the portfolio αX +(1−α)Y in two parts,
hold α times the position X and 1 − α times the position Y and consequently reduce the
risk. Similar arguments are provided by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1997, 1999).
The zero payoff condition is a natural assumption, which states that “no investment” means
no risk. The risk-free condition says that adding a risk free position to the portfolio does not
change the risk! This is different as in the definition of coherent risk measure introduced by
Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999), where the authors interpret a risk measure as the
minimal extra cash one should add to his risky position and allocate “prudently”, to make
the investment acceptable. Dealing with portfolio selection, we suggest that the contribution
of a risk free position to the portfolio should be captured by the reward measure and not by
the risk measure. Finally the isotonicity with respect to second order stochastic dominance
ensures that an investment which is preferred to another one by all risk averse rational
expected utility maximizers, is at most so risky as the dominated investment.
The measure ρi arises from an axiomatic definition of risk measures based on the four
properties listed above: A well known example is the expected shortfall (see Bertsimas,
Lauprete, and Samatov 2004). The variance, value-at-risk and, coherent risk measures in-
stead, do not satisfies our axiomatic definition, as demonstrated in De Giorgi (2004).
Note that we do not impose the same measure of risk for all investors. In fact, investors’
perception of risk can differ and thus also the way of measuring it (Weber and Milliman 1997),
as long as the four properties above are satisfied.
The portfolio payoff X =
∑K
k=0 Ak θ
i
k ∈ X for investor i is said to be (µ, ρi)-efficient iff
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(i) q(X) ≤ wi (budget feasible), and
(ii) ( ∃Y ∈ X such that q(Y ) ≤ wi and one of the following two statements is satisfied
(a) ρi(X) > ρi(Y ) and µ(X) = µ(Y ) or,
(b) ρi(X) = ρi(Y ) and µ(X) < µ(Y ).
From De Giorgi (2004, Theorem 2.1), X ∈ X is (µ, ρi)-efficient iff X is budget feasible and
uniquely minimizes the function Ri = ξi ρi − µi over Bi, for some ξi > 0. Moreover, there
exists a convex, non-decreasing function gi on [0, 1], with gi(0) = 0 and gi(1) = 1 such that
Ri(X) = −
∫ 0
−∞
(
gi(FX(x))− 1
)
dx−
∫ ∞
0
gi
(
FX(x)
)
dx (2.1)
and FX is the cumulative distribution function of X under P. The convex function gi is
called distortion and uniquely characterizes the investor’s risk preferences. In particular,
due to the convexity of gi, investors put more weights to the negative outcomes of X. For
example, if investors only weight the outcomeq of X that are smaller than a given α%-
quintile, then the corresponding measure of risk is the expected-shortfall. Moreover, the
function Ri corresponds to a Choquet integral and is used in the Choquet Expected Utility
Theory of Schmeidler (1989). Therefore, the investor’s portfolio choice problem is:
min
X ∈Bi
Ri(X), (2.2)
or equivalently
max
X ∈Bi
−Ri(X). (2.3)
We introduce the following definition:
Definition 2.1 (Financial market equilibrium). Given a risk-free rate r, a financial
market equilibrium consists of a price vector qˆ ∈ RK+1 with qˆ0 = 11+r and allocations Xˆ i ∈ X
for i = 1, ..., I, such that
(i) Xˆ i maximizes −Ri over Bi (investors’ portfolio choice), and
(ii) ∃α0 ∈ R such that α0 1 +
∑I
i=1 Xˆ
i = ω˜ (markets clear).
Instead of using this last Definition directly, we first impose some restrictions on the
equilibrium prices qˆ. Note that the goal function Ri is strictly monotone and therefore a
necessary condition for the portfolio decision problem (2.3) to have a solution (and thus for
condition (i) in Definition 2.1) is arbitrage opportunities do not exist. Therefore, market
equilibrium requires the following condition on prices:
G+ ∩ {X ∈ X |q(X) ≤ 0} = {0} , (2.4)
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where G+ is the subset of elements in G with non-negative outcomes in all states of nature.
Equation (2.4) means that every non-negative, non-zero payoff must have a strictly positive
price. If equation (2.4) is violated for some price vector q, investors can obtain, at zero
costs, a payoff that is non-negative in all states and strictly positive in at least one state.
Therefore, they can infinitely increase their objective functions and no optimal solution to
their investment problem exist. A price vector q ∈ RK+1 such that equation (2.4) is satisfied,
is said to be arbitrage free for the marketed subspace X .
In order to discuss the equilibrium outcome of our model, suppose that q is an arbitrage
free price vector for the marketed subspace X . In this case, there exists a security & ∈ X ,
E
[
&
]
= 1 such that
q(X) =
1
1 + r
& ·X (2.5)
for all X ∈ X and q(X) ≥ 0 . & is called the pricing portfolio (Duffie 1988) or ideal security
(Magill and Quinzii 1996). Using the pricing portfolio & we can rewrite the budget set as
Bi = {X ∈ X |& ·X ≤ (1+ r)wi} and the no-arbitrage decision problem of investor i is given
by
max
X∈X
−Ri(X), & ·X ≤ (1 + r)wi. (2.6)
An equivalent definition of financial market equilibria is now the following:
Definition 2.2. Given a risk-free rate r, a financial market equilibrium consists of a price
vector &ˆ ∈ X and allocations Xˆ i ∈ X for i = 1, ..., I, such that
(i) Xˆ i maximizes −Ri subject to &ˆ ·X ≤ (1 + r)wi for i = 1, ..., I, and
(ii) ∃α0 ∈ R such that α0 1 +
∑I
i=1 Xˆ
i = ω˜.
We now come back to the individual portfolio choice of equations (2.2) and (2.3). We
rewrite the function Ri using its integral representation (2.1). Consider X ∈ G and take a
permutation ζ of Ω = {1, . . . , S} such that X(ζ(1)) ≤ X(ζ(2)) ≤ · · · ≤ X(ζ(S)). Then
Ri(X) = −X(ζ(1))−
S−1∑
s=1
gi
(
1−
s∑
l=1
pζ(l)
)
[X(ζ(s + 1))−X(ζ(s))] .
Let
qiζ(1) = 1− gi(1− pζ(1)),
qiζ(s) = g
i
(
1−
s−1∑
l=1
pζ(l)
)
− gi
(
1−
s∑
l=1
pζ(l)
)
, for s = 2, . . . , S.
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Note that qiζ(s) ≥ 0 since g is non-decreasing,
∑S
s=1 q
i
ζ(s) = 1, and q
i
ζ(1) ≥ qiζ(2) ≥ · · · ≥ qiζ(S)
since gi is convex. Moreover,
Ri(X) = −
S∑
s=1
qiζ(s) X(ζ(s)) = −
S∑
s=1
qiζ(s)∑
l:X(ζ(l))=X(ζ(s)) pζ(l)
pζ(s) X(ζ(s)).
Note that∑
l:X(ζ(l))=X(ζ(s)) q
i
ζ(l)∑
l:X(ζ(l))=X(ζ(s)) pζ(l)
=
gi
(
P
[
X ≥ X(ζ(s))])− gi (P[X > X(ζ(s))])
P
[
X = X(ζ(s))
] = f iX(X(ζ(s)))
where
f iX(x) =
gi
(
P
[
X ≥ x])− gi (P[X > x])
P
[
X = x
]
is a positive, non-increasing function of x, since gi is non-decreasing and convex. Moreover,
by definition, f iX(X) ∈ G with
E
[
f iX(X)
]
= 1, f iX(X) ≥ 0 and, Ri(X) = −E
[
f iX(X)X
]
= −f iX(X) ·X.
Thus, the vector f iX(X) ∈ G is a probability measure on (Ω,F) and the functional Ri is the
negative expectation with respect to f iX(X) ∈ G. Similar results are given by Carlier and
Dana (2003) for non atomic spaces. The optimization problem (2.6) can be rewritten as
max
X∈X ,λi
f iX(X) ·X − λi (& ·X − (1 + r)wi) = max
X∈X ,λi
(
f iX(X)− λi &
) ·X + λi (1 + r)wi. (2.7)
where λi is the Lagrange multiplier. Let Li(X,λi) = (f iX(X)− λi &) ·X +λi (1+ r)wi be the
Lagrange function. We are now able to prove the main result of this section. The following
relationship between any efficient allocation Xˆ i and the pricing portfolio is satisfied.
Theorem 2.1. Let Xˆ i ∈ argmaxX∈X −Ri(X), s.t. & ·X ≤ (1 + r)wi, then
f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i)‖ = &
and & · Xˆ i = (1 + r)wi for all i = 1, . . . , I, where for Y ∈ G, Y = Y⊥ + Y‖ is the unique
orthogonal decomposition of Y with respect to X , i.e. Y⊥ ⊥ X and Y‖ ∈ X .
Proof. (i) We prove: & · Xˆ i = (1 + r)wi.
Let Xˆ i ∈ argmaxX∈X −Ri(X), s.t. & · X ≤ (1 + r)wi. Since the function −Ri(X) is
strictly monotone and the risk-less asset exists, Xˆ i must satisfy the budget restriction
with equality, i.e. & · Xˆ i = (1 + r)wi.
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(ii) We prove: f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i)‖ = &.
Let Z ∈ X such that & · Z = 0 (i.e. Z ∈ span(&)⊥ ∩ X ) and Y i = Xˆ i + )Z for ) > 0.
Then Yi ∈ X ∩ Bi and
Li(Y i,λi) = (f iY i(Y i)− λi &) · Y i + λi (1 + r)wi
= f iY i(Y
i) · Y i − λi & · Xˆ i + λi (1 + r)wi
=
(
f iY i(Y
i)− f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i)
)
· Y i + ) f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i) · Z + Li(Xˆ i,λi).
Let ζ be a permutation of Ω such that Xˆ i(ζ(1)) ≤ Xˆ i(ζ(2)) ≤ · · · ≤ Xˆ i(ζ(S)). With-
out loss of generality, for ) > 0 small enough, Y i(ζ(1)) ≤ Y i(ζ(2)) ≤ · · · ≤ Y i(ζ(S)).
In fact, if for some s ∈ {1, . . . S − 1}, Xˆ i(ζ(s)) = Xˆ i(ζ(s + 1)) and Yˆ i(ζ(s)) >
Yˆ i(ζ(s + 1)), then we take the permutation ζ˜ of Ω such that ζ˜(l) = ζ(l) for all
l (= s, s + 1 and ζ˜(s) = ζ(s + 1), ζ˜(s + 1) = ζ(s). Then (f iY i(Y i) − f iXˆi(Xˆ i)) · Yi =
−∑Ss=1 (qζ(s) − qζ(s)) Yi(ζ(s)) = 0 and thus
Li(Y i,λi) = ) f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i) · Z + Li(Xˆ i,λi).
Therefore f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i) · Z = 0, else either Yi = Xˆ i + )Z or Yi = Xˆ i − )Z contradicts the
optimality of Xˆ i.
Let now decompose f i
Xˆi
(X i) as f i
Xˆi
(X i) = f i
Xˆi
(X i)‖ + f iXˆi(X
i)⊥, where f iXˆi(X
i)‖ ∈ X
and f i
Xˆi
(X i)⊥ ⊥ X . Let Z ∈ span(&)⊥. Then 0 = & ·Z = & · (Z⊥+Z‖) = & ·Z‖, therefore
Z‖ ∈ span(&)⊥ ∩ X . From the previous result it follows
0 = f i
Xˆi
(X i) · Z‖ = f iXˆi(X i)‖ · Z‖ = f iXˆi(X i)‖ · Z.
Since this is true for all Z ∈ span(&)⊥, it follows that f i
Xˆi
(X i)‖ ∈ span(&) and therefore
it exists αˆi ∈ R such that f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i)‖ = αˆi &. Since 1 ∈ X , 0 = f iXˆi(Xˆ i)⊥ · 1 =
E
[
f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i)⊥
]
and thus
1 = E
[
f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i)
]
= E
[
f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i)⊥
]
+ E
[
f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i)‖
]
= E
[
f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i)‖
]
= αˆi E
[
&
]
= αˆi.
This completes the proof.
In our model, the vector f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i) defines the marginal rate of substitution of investor i
which is strictly related to its risk perception described by gi. The theorem states that the
component of the marginal rate of substitution that belongs to the marketed subspace, must
be collinear to the pricing portfolio at any optimal allocation Xˆ i. Now, we restrict ourself to
the case of complete markets. Then f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i) ∈ X and thus f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i)⊥ = 0 for all i. Therefore,
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f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i) = f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i)‖. With incomplete markets, the same is true if we assume that f iXˆi(Xˆ
i) is
in the marketed subspace. From the previous theorem, we immediately obtain the following
result on the optimal allocations Xˆ i, i = 1, . . . , I.
Theorem 2.2. Let Xˆ i ∈ argmaxX∈X −Ri(X), s.t. & · X ≤ (1 + r)wi for i = 1, . . . , I.
Suppose that the corresponding distortions gi are strictly convex for all i = 1, . . . , I. Then if
K + 1 = S, i.e. markets are complete, the optimal payoffs Xˆ1, . . . , XˆI are comonotonic, i.e.
for all s, s′ ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , I} we have (Xˆ i(s)− Xˆ i(s′)) (Xˆj(s)− Xˆj(s′)) ≥ 0 and the
inequality is strict if Xˆ i(s) (= Xˆ i(s′) for some i.
Proof. From Theorem 2.1, f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i) = & for i = 1, . . . , I. The functions f i
Xˆi
are strictly
decreasing, since the gi’s are strictly convex. Suppose now that for s, s′ ∈ Ω, Xˆ i(s) ≥ Xˆ i(s′).
Then f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i(s)) ≤ f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i(s′)), i.e. &(s) ≤ &(s′). Thus, f j
Xˆj
(Xˆj(s)) ≤ f j
Xˆj
(Xˆj(s′)) and
therefore also Xˆj(s) ≥ Xˆj(s′) for any j ∈ {1, . . . , I}. Moreover, the inequality is strict for
Xˆj if it is for Xˆ i.
The theorem states that investors’ optimal allocations are comonotonic, i.e. cannot be
used as a hedge of each other. This is a generalization of the well-known Tobin Separation
Principle in the classical mean-variance model. Comonotonicity immediately implies the
following property of the pricing portfolio &ˆ at any financial market equilibrium:
Theorem 2.3. Let (lˆ, Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆ i) be a financial market equilibrium. Suppose that the cor-
responding distortions gi are strictly convex for all i = 1, . . . , I. Then if K + 1 = S, i.e.
markets are complete, there exists a strictly decreasing function f such that f(ω˜) = & and
f(ω˜) = f iω˜(ω˜) for all i = 1, . . . , I. The functions f
i
· (·) are given by:
f iX(x) =
gi
(
P
[
X ≥ x])− gi (P[X > x])
P
[
X = x
] . (2.8)
Proof. From the previous theorem, we have that all optimal payoffs Xˆ i (i = 1, . . . , I) are
comonotonic and therefore also the sums
∑I
i=1 Xˆ
i and
∑I
i=1 Xˆ
i + α 1 for all α ∈ R.
By definition of financial market equilibrium, we find α0 ∈ R such that ω˜ =
∑I
i=1 Xˆ
i +α0 1.
Therefore, ω˜ is also comonotonic to Xˆ1, . . . , XˆI and thus f iω˜(ω˜) = f
i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i) = &. Take f = f iω˜
for some i = 1, . . . , I, where f i are given as in equation (2.8).
At any financial market equilibrium, the pricing kernel &ˆ is a monotone function of the
aggregate market return. The exact shape of this function is given by equation (2.8) and
directly relates to the investors’ perception of risk through the distortion gi. It also follows
that a necessary condition for the existence of financial market equilibria is that investors
have homogeneous risk perceptions. Obviously, this result is not true in a General Equilib-
rium Model, as shown for example in Hens and Pilgram (2003, Chapter 2). In our model this
is due to the comonotonicity of investors’ optimal allocations, which implies the relationship
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f i
Xˆi
(Xˆ i) = f j
Xˆj
(Xˆj) (for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , I}) holding at any financial market equilibrium. If
comonotonocity is violated, then for any given pricing kernel there exists at least one investor
with a marginal rate of substitution that is not collinear to the pricing kernel. Consequently,
since markets are complete, for this investor there exists an allocation that is orthogonal to
the pricing kernel, but not to the vector of marginal rates of substitution, thus a zero-costs
allocation that further increase his or her utility, i.e. an arbitrage opportunity. This con-
tradicts the existence of equilibria. Therefore, the investors’ distortions gi must be identical
at the survival probabilities F Xˆi(Xˆ
i(s)) = F Xˆj(Xˆ
j(s)), and thus investors’ risk perceptions
must correspond. This result also reduces the equilibrium model just described to a repre-
sentative investor model, where market equilibrium can be fully described as the outcome of
a single investor optimization problem. Consequently, the market portfolio is second order
stochastic dominance efficient (see also Post 2003). We can state the “reward-risk” Security
Market Line Theorem.
Corollary 2.1. Let (lˆ, Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆ i) be a financial market equilibrium and q(ω˜) > 0. Suppose
that the corresponding distortions gi are strictly convex for all i = 1, . . . , I. Then if K +1 =
S, i.e. markets are complete, for all X ∈ X :
E
[
f(Rω˜) (RX − r)
]
= 0, (2.9)
where RX =
X−q(X)
q(X) and Rω˜ =
ω˜−q(ω˜)
q(ω˜) . Therefore For X ∈ X
E
[
RX
]− r = cov [f(Rω˜), RX ]
cov [f(Rω˜), Rω˜]
(E
[
Rω˜
]− r). (2.10)
Proof. (i) ω˜ and Rω˜ are comonotonic.
Since q(ω˜) > 0, then if for s, s′ ∈ Ω, ω˜(s) ≥ ω˜(s) then Rω˜(s) ≥ Rω˜(s′). Thus, ω˜ and
Rω˜ are comonotonic.
(ii) Since ω˜ and Rω˜ are comonotonic, then f(ω˜) = f(Rω˜), where f is defined as in the
proof of the previous Corollary. Moreover, for X ∈ X
E
[
f(Rω˜)RX
]
= f(ω˜) ·
(
X − q(X)
q(X)
)
=
1
q(X)
f(ω˜) ·X − 1 = (1 + r)− 1 = r.
Therefore, for X ∈ X(
r − E [Rω˜]) (E [RX]− r) = (r − E [RX]) (E [Rω˜]− r)
⇒ (E [f(Rω˜)Rω˜]− E [Rω˜]) (E [RX]− r) = (E [f(Rω˜)RX]− E [RX]) (E [Rω˜]− r)
⇒ cov [f(Rω˜), Rω˜] (E
[
RX
]− r) = cov [f(Rω˜), RX ] (E [Rω˜]− r)
⇒ E [RX]− r = cov [f(Rω˜), RX ]
cov [f(Rω˜), Rω˜]
(E
[
Rω˜
]− r).
We call the factor cov [f(Rω˜),RX ]cov [f(Rω˜),Rω˜ ] , the reward-risk beta.
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3 Empirical analysis
This section empirically tests the equilibrium condition (2.9) and compares the empirical
performance of the reward-risk CAPM with that of the mean-variance CAPM.
3.1 Transformation function
Our analysis will focus on the simple one-parameter distortion function
g(x) = 1− (1− x)γ, (3.11)
where 0 < γ < 1. This transformation function has a compelling interpretation. If x =
P
[
R ≥ r%], then g(x) is the probability that the maximum of γ independent draws of R
exceeds the critical value r%, that is g(x) = P
[
maxi=1,...,γ Ri ≥ r%
]
4. Thus, γ is a natural
measure of optimism and pessimism (see Bassett, Koenker, and Kordas 2004); γ > 1 reflects
optimistic view and 0 < γ < 1 a pessimistic view. Indeed, for any integer γ ≥ 1, applying
the distortion function g to the true distribution, investors evaluate portfolio payoffs as they
were distributed as the maximum of γ independent draws from the original distribution,
suggesting that their belief are more optimistic than the true distribution. Instead, if γ < 1,
investors’ perception is more pessimistic.
We also considered a set of alternative distortion functions. The alternatives yield ei-
ther comparable results (for example g(x) = − 1γ log (−(1− exp(−γ))x + 1)) or a worst
fit (g(x) = xγ). We also used the second-order stochastic dominance tests of Post (2003)
and Kuosmanen (2004), which entirely avoid the specification of the transformation func-
tion. Interestingly, these tests yield results that are very comparable with the results for
the distortion function (3.11). These findings suggest that optimization across all possible
transformation functions does not materially change our conclusions, supporting the choice
of the one-parameter transformation (3.11).
3.2 Empirical methodology
In practice, we cannot directly check the equilibrium condition (2.9), because the ex ante
return distribution of the assets is unknown. However, we can estimate the return dis-
tribution using time-series return observations and employ statistical tests to determine if
the equilibrium condition is violated to a significant degree. Throughout the text, we will
represent the observations for the risky assets by the matrix R = (r1, . . . , rt, . . . , rτ ), where
rt = (r1,t, . . . , rK,t)′ be the observation of the risky assets’ returns (R1, . . . , RK)′, Rk = Ak−qkqk ,
at time t = 1, . . . , τ . Also, we will use rω˜ = (rω˜,1, . . . , rω˜,τ )′ for the observed returns of the
market portfolio.
The function F : RK → [0, 1]K is the empirical multivariate cumulative distribution
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function of (R1, . . . , RK)′ for the observations (rt)t=1,...,τ , i.e. for r% ∈ RK
F (r%) =
1
τ
τ∑
t=1
1rt≤r" ,
where 1rt≤r" is the vector (1r1,t≤r"1 , . . . , 1rK,t≤r"K )
′. Similarly, we can construct the following
univariate empirical cumulative distribution function for the market portfolio return, i.e. for
r% ∈ R:
G(r%) =
1
τ
τ∑
t=1
1rω˜,t≤r" .
As discussed above, we will use the distortion function (3.11) in our analysis. Applying
this distortion to the empirical distribution G of the market portfolio return, we obtain the
following reward-risk pricing kernel:
fRω˜(r
%) =
g
(
1
τ
∑τ
t=1 1rω˜,t≥r"
)− g ( 1τ ∑τt=1 1rω˜,t>r")
1
τ
∑τ
t=1 1rω˜,t=r"
, (3.12)
where r% ∈ {rω˜,1, . . . , rω˜,τ}. In this section, we will use fRω˜(rω˜) = (fRω˜(rω˜,1), . . . , fRω˜(rω˜,τ )).
the empirical deviations from the equilibrium condition (2.9), also known as pricing errors
or alphas, are defined as
αˆ = fRω˜(rω˜)(R
′ − eτ e′τ r) (3.13)
where eτ is a (1 × τ) unity vector. Alternatively, we can write the alphas in the following
manner:
αˆ = (µˆ− eτ r)− βˆfRω˜ (rω˜) (µˆω˜ − r) (3.14)
where µˆ = (µˆ1, . . . , µˆK)′ and µˆω˜ are the sample means of the individual assets and the market
portfolio respectively and
βˆfRω˜ (rω˜) =
(fRω˜(rω˜)− e′τ )(R′ − eτ µˆ′)
(fRω˜(rω˜)− e′τ )′ (r′ω˜ − eτ µˆω˜)
(3.15)
are the reward-risk betas.
We now turn to the issue of statistical inference about the equilibrium condition (2.9) based
on the estimated alphas. Under the null hypothesis, the alpha have means E
[
αˆ
]
= 0K . The
covariance matrix Ω = E
[
αˆ αˆ′
]
of the alphas can be estimated in a consistent manner by5
Ωˆ =
1
τ
(fRω˜(rω˜).R) (fRω˜(rω˜).R)′. (3.16)
In the spirit of the generalized Methods of Moments, we can use the following test statistic
to aggregate the individual alphas6:
JT = τ αˆ′ Ωˆ
−1
αˆ. (3.17)
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Assuming that the observations are serially independently and identically distributed (iid)
random draws, the test statistic obeys an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with K − 1
degrees of freedom7. We will compare the empirical performance of our reward-risk CAPM
with that of the standard mean-variance CAPM. The mean-variance CAPM can be repre-
sented by the linear pricing kernel f(Rω˜) = a+ bRω˜ with a = 1+
µˆ2ω˜
σˆ2ω˜
and b = − µˆω˜
σˆ2ω˜
, where σˆ2ω˜
is the sample variance of the market portfolio return8. We can then apply the same method-
ology as for the reward-risk CAPM. For the mean-variance CAPM, this methodology comes
very close to the Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) methodology. The difference is that
GRS assume that the returns obey a multivariate normal distribution and hence are able
to use the small sample distribution rather than the asymptotic distribution. Since we use
large samples, both methodologies yield identical results in our study.
3.3 Data sets
In our analysis, we will employ benchmark portfolios that are formed on market beta and
price momentum. Beta-sorted portfolios have been used extensively to test the mean-
variance CAPM; see Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972), Friend and Blume (1973), Fama
and MacBeth (1973), Reinganum (1981) and Fama and French (1992), among others. The
empirical results suggest that the mean-variance CAPM is violated, because the difference
between the means of low-beta stocks and high-beta stocks is too small relative to the dif-
ference between the betas. In other words, by buying low-beta stocks and selling high-beta
stocks, we can “beat the market” (achieve a higher Sharpe-ratio than the market portfolio).
More recently, much research attention has been focused on momentum portfolios (see for
example Jagadeesh and Titman 1993, 2001). The empirical results suggest that the mean-
variance CAPM is severely violated, because the short-term loser stocks have low means
and high betas, while the short-term winner stocks have high means and low betas. Thus,
we can beat the market by buying short-term winners and selling short-term losers. Part
of this effect can be attributed to the high turnover and correspondingly high transactions
costs of momentum strategies (see for instance Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou 2004). Thus,
capital market models that assume a perfect capital market (including the mean- variance
and reward-risk models) cannot be expected to completely explain the returns of momentum
strategies. Still, momentum portfolios are an interesting test case for comparing the mean-
variance and reward-risk models, because the returns to momentum strategies generally are
characterized by asymmetry and hence the two models can be expected to yield different
results9.
Our analysis uses monthly stock returns (including dividends and capital gains) for the
period from January 1931 to December 2002 from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) at the University of Chicago. We select ordinary common US stocks listed on
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and NASDAQ
markets. We exclude ADRs, REITs, closed-end- funds, units of beneficial interest, and
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foreign stocks. Stocks are required to have 60 months of prior return data available and
information about the market capitalization at formation date; the past returns are needed
for calculating beta and the market capitalization is required for constructing value-weighted
portfolios. Thus, to be included at December 1930 a stock must have trading information
since January 1926 and a (positive) market capitalization for December 1930. A stock is
excluded from the analysis if there is no more return information available and the delisting
return or partial monthly return provided by CRSP is then used for the last observation. On
average 1,854 stocks are included in the portfolios, starting with 373 (in December 1930) and
ending with 3,730 (in December 2002) after reaching a maximum of 3,907 (January 1999).
From the selected stocks, we form our beta portfolios and momentum portfolios. We
sort the individual stocks into ten deciles based on a given stock characteristic (beta or
momentum) and compute value-weighted portfolio returns of all stocks in each decile. Beta
portfolios are based on historical prior 60-month market beta. These portfolios are formed
at the end of each year, starting in December 1930, 60 months after January 1926, the start
of the CRSP reporting for individual stocks. Momentum portfolios are based on the price
performance during the period from 12 months ago to one month ago (past 12-1 returns),
similar to Fama and French (1996). For these portfolios, formation takes place on a monthly
basis rather than annually. The market index is a value-weighted average of all US stocks
included in this study. The one-month US Treasury bill is obtained from Ibbotson Associates.
Table I gives descriptive statistics for the excess returns of the benchmark portfolios and the
market portfolio.
[Table 1 about here.]
3.4 Empirical results
As discussed in Section 3.2, we fix the risk aversion parameter γ such that the market portfo-
lio alpha equals zero. Since both data sets use the same market portfolio (the CRSP all-share
index) and the same sample period (January 1931 to December 2002), both data sets yield
the same parameter value; γ = 0.877. Panel A of Figure 1 shows the associated distortion
function g(x). Clearly, the distortion function is convex, reflecting the risk aversion of the
representative investor (γ < 1); the representative investor has a pessimistic view of the
probabilities. Panel B shows the reward-risk pricing kernel f ω˜(Rω˜) . The pricing kernel is
a parameterized function of the probabilities and depends indirectly on the market portfolio
return via the link between returns and probabilities. Due to this indirect link, the pricing
kernel has a “twisting” shape when plotted against the returns. Still, the pricing kernel
is approximately linear for losses and approximately constant for gains. Interestingly, the
mean-semivariance CAPM of Hogan and Warren (1974) and Bawa and Lindenberg (1977)
predicts this shape for the pricing kernel; this model replaces variance with semivariance and
yields a piecewise linear pricing kernel that is linear for losses and constant for gains.
15
[Figure 1 about here.]
The value for the risk aversion parameter γ is fixed without reference to the benchmark
portfolios and it is not clear a priori that this value yields a good empirical fit for the
benchmark portfolios. Table 2 shows the empirical fit for the mean-variance and reward-risk
models. Confirming known results, we see a strong “beta effect”. Given the equity premium
of 0.67% per month, the spread of the means (0.28% per month) is too small to be consistent
with the spread of the mean-variance betas (0.77). This translates to large alphas, ranking
from 0.180 for the lowest-beta stocks to -0.274 for the highest-beta stocks. The “momentum
effect” is also clearly present. The short-term losers have a low mean (0.014) and a high
mean- variance beta (-1.57), yielding an alpha of -1.031. By contrast, the short-term winners
have a high mean (1.331) and a low mean-variance beta (1.002), which translates to an alpha
of 0.662.
Interestingly, the reward-risk model gives a better fit than the mean-variance model. For
both the beta portfolios and the momentum portfolios, the reward-risk betas are more in line
with the means than the mean-variance betas are. For example, the beta of the lowest-beta
portfolio increases from 0.48 to 0.49, while the beta of the highest-beta portfolio decreases
from 1.31 to 1.26, reducing the beta spread from 0.83 to 0.77. The narrowing in the beta
spread is translated into generally lower alphas. The overall JT statistic decreases from
13.55 to 11.87 and the associated p-value increases from 0.14 to 0.22.
For the momentum portfolios, the improvements are even greater. The beta spread
increases from -0.55 to -0.35 and the overall JT statistic decreases from 61.57 to 50.59.
However, the improvements do not suffice to yield a positive mean-beta relationship, and
the reward-risk model still has to be convincingly rejected (p-value=0.00). Again, part of
the momentum profits may be attributable to transaction costs and hence we do not expect
any perfect-market model to rationalize the entire momentum effect. Still, the substantial
reduction in the alphas suggests that the reward-risk model better captures the cross-section
of returns than the mean-variance model does.
Since the reward-risk pricing kernel is similar to the two-piece pricing kernel of the mean-
semivariance model, it is not surprising that these results are very similar to those of Post
and Van Vliet (2004), who compared the mean-variance model and the mean-semivariance
model.
[Table 2 about here.]
As a final illustration of the improvements from using the reward-risk model, Figure 2
shows the actual and predicted means for the beta portfolios and the momentum portfolios.
We clearly see the improved fit for the beta portfolios due to the narrowing of the beta
spread. We also see the improvements for momentum portfolios, despite the poor fit of both
models (a flat/negative mean-beta relationship).
[Figure 2 about here.]
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Despite the improved fit for beta and momentum portfolios, we stress that we have
considered only one particular distortion function (10) and we have considered only beta
and momentum portfolios. Further research could focus on a more rigorous comparison of
the mean-variance and reward-risk models.
4 Conclusion
The “reward-risk CAPM” is the capital market equilibrium model associated with the general
reward-risk portfolio model by De Giorgi (2004). Instead of arguing in favor of one particular
risk measure, this model is based on general axioms for investors’ preferences, including
isotonicity with respect to the second order stochastic dominance. Our analysis builds on
three pillars.
First, we establish that a necessary condition for the existence of market equilibrium
in complete markets with risk averse investors is that investors’ optimal allocations are
comonotonic. If this is not the case, then for any given pricing kernel, there exists at least
one investor with the marginal rate of substitution that is not collinear to the pricing kernel.
Consequently, since markets are complete, for this investor there exist zero-costs alloca-
tions that increase her utility, thus arbitrage opportunities. In turn, comonotonicity implies
that investors’ risk profiles are identical and, the market equilibrium and aggregate demand
must be described with a representative agent model. This result is quite surprising: Cap-
ital market equilibria in complete markets with reward-risk investors requires homogenous
preferences.
Second, we derive the pricing kernel as an explicitly given monotone decreasing function of
market portfolio return, depending on the representative agent’s risk perception through his
probability distortion function. The pricing kernel formulation also allows for the familiar
formulation in terms of a trade-off between expected return and systematic risk, where
systematic risk is measured by means of our risk-reward beta.
Third, we empirically compare the mean-variance CAPM with the “reward-risk” CAPM.
For illustrative purposes, we impose one particular shape for the probability distortion func-
tion characterizing the representative investor’s risk profile and, we use canonical portfolios
formed on market beta and price momentum to test market portfolio efficiency. Interest-
ingly, the pricing kernel arising from the reward-risk analysis is similar to that obtained
in the mean-semivariance equilibrium model. Moreover, the reward-risk model significantly
improves the fit relative to the classical mean-variance model, because the reward-risk betas
exhibit less dispersion than the standard betas.
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Notes
1The Choquet Expected Utility Theory of Schmeidler (1989) generalizes the Expected
Utility Theory by assuming that the independence axiom of von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944) only holds for comonotonic outcomes. Two random outcomes X,Y ∈ G are said to be
comonotonic, if X(s) ≥ X(s′) ⇒ Y (s) ≥ Y (s′) for all states of nature s, s′ ∈ Ω. Schmeidler
(1989) shows that preferences that satisfy comonotonic independence, together with mono-
tonicity, continuity (Archimedian axiom) and non-degeneracity, can be uniquely represented
as expectation of a concave utility index with respect to a non-additive probability (called
capacity). The motivation for the Choquet Expected Utility Theory comes from the obser-
vation by the Ellsberg (1961) experiment, that decision makers’ behavior is inconsistent with
the independence axiom of the classical Expected Utility Theory.
2The notion of “representative investor” considered here is that of “demand aggregation”,
as defined by Rubinstein (1974). This is a stronger concept of “representative investor”
than the “in-sample” notion of Huang and Litzenberger (1988), where the given equilibrium
point is equivalently described as the solution of a single investor optimization problem. The
stronger notion that we use allows “out-of-sample” predictions.
3For the sake of simplicity, we consider a finite number of possible state of nature S.
4For any integer γ > 0, this can be demonstrated by the means of the following chain of
equalities:
P
[
max
i=1,...,γ
Ri ≥ r%
]
= 1− P[ max
i=1,...,γ
Ri < r
%
]
= 1− P[Ri < r%, i = 1, . . . , γ]
= 1− P[Ri < r%]γ = 1− (1− P[Ri ≥ r%])γ = 1− (1− x)γ = g(x).
5Slightly departing from the conventional notation, the Hadamard product operator .
is used here for element-by-element multiplication of the given column vector fRω˜(rω˜) with
every column of the matrix R.
6Strictly speaking, our statistical methodology applies only when the kernel is exogenously
given. However, the distortion parameter gamma is determined to set the sample pricing
error of the market portfolio equal to zero and thus depends on the return data. Still, the
univariate return distribution of the market portfolio, which determines gamma, is far less
sensitive to sampling variation than the multivariate return distribution of the ten benchmark
portfolios, which determines the pricing errors. Indeed, a bootstrapping exercise revealed
that gamma is not materially affected by sampling variation. For this reason, we treat the
kernel as exogenously given in our analysis. We thank Fabio Trojani for pointing out this
potential problem.
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7The reduction of one degree of freedom occurs due to the restriction that the alpha of
the market portfolio should equal zero. Thus, in the case of a single risky asset (K = 1), the
market portfolio is fully efficient and JT = 0 by construction. More generally, for K assets,
the test statistics behaves as the sum of squares of K − 1 contemporaneously identically
distributed and independent random variables.
8This function is found by selecting the parameters a and b such that the sample mean
of fRω˜(Rω˜) equals unity and the sample alpha of the market portfolio equals zero.
9Under a normal distribution, all representative agent models that are consistent second-
order stochastic dominance, including the reward-risk model, yield the same prediction as
the mean-variance model.
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Mean Stdev. Skewness Kurtosis Min MaxMarket 0.668 5.467 0.457 8.909 -28.59 38.57 Low 0.601 4.257 -0.151 6.136 -23.51 25.93 2 0.620 4.643 0.399 7.954 -23.00 34.53 3 0.666 5.231 0.549 9.399 -25.76 39.45 4 0.634 5.486 0.562 8.919 -28.65 40.97 5 0.852 6.337 0.813 10.182 -29.60 52.58 6 0.721 6.770 0.771 10.408 -36.07 49.72 7 0.766 7.189 0.773 10.489 -33.19 58.67 8 0.772 8.219 1.446 14.445 -34.39 69.63 9 0.853 9.153 1.483 14.728 -37.26 80.11 Be
ta Port
folios 
High 0.885 10.386 1.191 10.980 -37.91 86.49 Loser 0.014 10.200 1.923 16.170 -43.17 94.38 2 0.411 8.607 2.025 21.104 -43.37 84.03 3 0.444 7.243 1.656 18.435 -38.02 65.34 4 0.618 6.616 1.414 14.977 -32.11 55.17 5 0.570 6.320 1.342 16.800 -33.08 57.66 6 0.602 5.977 0.663 11.134 -31.37 49.58 7 0.715 5.687 0.008 6.746 -31.68 35.05 8 0.921 5.673 0.404 6.349 -24.83 40.56 9 0.939 5.961 -0.170 4.437 -28.78 38.43 Mome
ntum P
ortfolio
s 
Winner 1.331 6.696 -0.281 2.212 -28.21 32.44 
Table 1: The table shows descriptive statistics for the monthly return of the value-weighted
CRSP all-share market portfolio and the ten beta portfolios and the ten momentum portfo-
lios. The sample period is from January 1931 to December 2002 (τ = 864). Excess returns
are computed form the raw return observations by subtracting the return on the one-month
US Treasury bill.
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Mean-Variance CAPM Reward-Risk CAPM
αˆi βˆi αˆi βˆi
Low 0.180 0.476 0.166 0.491
2 0.107 0.579 0.109 0.577
3 0.071 0.672 0.082 0.660
B
et
a
P
or
tf
ol
io
s 4 0.000 0.716 0.009 0.706
5 0.115 0.833 0.135 0.810
6 -0.068 0.892 -0.052 0.874
7 -0.072 0.947 -0.057 0.930
8 -0.178 1.073 -0.132 1.021
9 -0.188 1.176 -0.136 1.118
High -0.274 1.310 -0.233 1.263
JT p-value JT p-value
13.546 0.139 11.872 0.221
Mean-Variance CAPM Reward-Risk CAPM
αˆi βˆi αˆi βˆi
Loser -1.031 1.566 -0.952 1.446
2 -0.508 1.377 -0.437 1.271
3 -0.359 1.203 -0.309 1.129
M
om
en
tu
m
P
or
tf
ol
io
s
4 -0.132 1.123 -0.089 1.059
5 -0.155 1.087 -0.123 1.037
6 -0.093 1.042 –0.085 1.029
7 0.053 0.992 0.038 1.014
8 0.268 0.978 0.267 0.980
9 0.273 0.998 0.240 1.048
Winner 0.662 1.002 0.599 1.097
JT p-value JT p-value
61.567 0.000 50.530 0.000
Table 2: This table shows the empirical results for the mean-variance and reward-risk model
for the beta portfolios and momentum portfolios. The results include the alpha (αˆi) and the
beta (βˆi) of each portfolio as well as the overall JT statistic and the associated p-value. the
sample period is from January 1031 to December 2002 (τ = 864).
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Panel A. Distortion function g(x)
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Panel B: Pricing kernel fRω˜(·)
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Figure 1: The figure shows the distortion function g(x) (Panel A) and the pricing kernel
fRω˜(·) (Panel B) used in the empirical analysis of the beta data set an the momentum data
set. The underlying value γ = 08.77 is selected such that the alpha of the market portfolio
equals zero. The distortion function and pricing kernel apply for both data sets, because
both data sets use the same market portfolio (the CRSP all-share index) and the sample
sample period (January 1931-December 2002). In Panel A, a 450 line is added for ease of
interpretation. In Panel B, the linear mean-variance kernel is added.
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Panel A: Beta portfolios
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Figure 2: The figure shows the actual means of the beta portfolio (Panel A) and the momen-
tum portfolios (Panel B) and the predicted means of the mean-variance model (the dots)
and the reward-risk model (the boxes). The predicted mean of a portfolio equals the actual
mean (see Table 1) minus the alphas (see Table 2). The parameters of both models are fixed
by setting the alpha of the market portfolio in the sample period (January 1931-December
2002) equal to zero. In both panels, a 450 line is added for ease of interpretation.
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